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Western bankruptcy systems have two relevant features: (a) The
systems are mandatory, that is, parties are required to use the state supplied
system; and (b) each system has a number of mandatory rules. Until
recently, reformers took these features as givens. The reformers' goal has
been to improve the mandatory bankruptcy system and the mandatory rules
within it.' Some scholars now contest the first relevant feature, arguing that
requiring parties always to use one bankruptcy system is inefficient. In a
recent essay,2 I challenged both of these features.
I made these claims:
(A) The only goal of a business bankruptcy law should be to reduce
the cost of debt capital, which the law best does by maximizing
the debt investors' insolvency state payoff.
(B) Regarding mandatory bankruptcy systems:
(i) Requiring parties always to use the mandatory state
system increases a borrowing firm's cost of capital over
the cost that would obtain in a world in which the firm and
its creditors could contract for an alternative bankruptcy
system.
(ii) If the rule against contracting for a preferred bankruptcy
system were relaxed, parties would write "bankruptcy
contracts" that would induce a borrowing firm to choose
the system that would be optimal for it and its creditors
were it to become insolvent.
(C) There should be few mandatory rules within bankruptcy
systems. More precisely, § 365(e) of the Bankruptcy Code,
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which prohibits the use of ipso facto clauses,3 should be
repealed. An analysis of this section also suggests that the
wisdom of other mandatory rules should be rethought.
Professor LoPucki's reply4 to my essay does not challenge claims (A)
and (C) and explicitly accepts claim (B)(i). Professor LoPucki attempts to
refute claim B(ii), and he makes a new, related claim. Regarding his
refutation, I showed formally that parties would write bankruptcy contracts
when all creditors (a) lend to the firm at the same time and (b) have the
same preferences regarding bankruptcy systems. I then extended this result
to argue that (a) parties would write these contracts when creditors lend at
different times; and (b) creditor conflict regarding bankruptcy contracts
would be rare if courts followed the absolute priority rule, and the few
inefficient refusals to sign these contracts would be eliminated were the law
to permit the preferences of a majority (in amount) of creditor claims to
determine whether a bankruptcy contract became effective. My essay thus
predicted that parties would write bankruptcy contracts if they were free to
do so and if bankruptcy law were appropriately modified. This prediction is
not testable today because bankruptcy contracts are unenforceable.' Hence,
my essay attempted to motivate reform. If there is a possibility that free
contracting over bankruptcy systems would increase welfare, and if there
otherwise is nothing wrong with free contracting, then free contracting
should be permitted.
Professor LoPucki argues that, even if one accepts the assumptions of
my model, strategic behavior by borrowing firms would prevent the writing
of bankruptcy contracts when the firm's creditors have the same
preferences regarding bankruptcy procedures but lend at different times. He
goes on to argue that actual creditors' preferences regarding bankruptcy
systems almost always differ, so that creditors could not agree on a
bankruptcy contract even if they lent at the same time. Taken together,
3. 11 U.S.C. § 365(e) (1994). An ipso facto clause authorizes a party to cancel a contract if its
contract partner becomes insolvent. When such clauses are illegal, the insolvent party's
bankruptcy trustee can accept-that is, keep in force-a contract that the solvent party would
prefer to end. My essay set out the intuition underlying the claim that § 365(e) should be repealed.
For a more extensive formal treatment, see Yeon-Koo Che & Alan Schwartz, Section 365.
Mandatory Bankruptcy Rules and Inefficient Continuance, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 441 (1999).
4. Lynn M. LoPucki, Contract Bankruptcy: A Reply to Alan Schwartz. 109 YALE. L.J. 317
(1999).
5. Professor LoPucki may disagree with the view that bankruptcy contracts are not
enforceable, see id. at 333, but the authority on whom he relies states: "[Clourts seem to accept.
almost as a matter of faith, that commercial agreements waiving the right to file for bankruptcy
are unenforceable," see id. at 333 n.96. According to another authority upon whom LoPucki
relies, the courts' belief also is shared by bankruptcy practitioners. See id. at 334 n.97: see also
Michael St. Patrick Baxter, Bankruptcy Proofing: Bankruptcy Provisions in Restructuring
Agreements, 8 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 483, 494 (1999) ("Agreements not to file for bankruptcy are
per se invalid, void as against public policy and in derogation of ... statutory rights to declare
bankruptcy, which cannot be waived.").
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these arguments lead Professor LoPucki to conclude that bankruptcy
contracts seldom would arise if the prohibition on writing them were
reversed.
This conclusion, if true, would be helpfully clarifying but would not
count strongly against an argument for greater freedom of contract in the
bankruptcy field. If free contracting over bankruptcy systems would be
efficient in ideal conditions, then the fact that scholars today cannot
plausibly show how real parties would write real contracts is not a serious
refutation. The real parties should be given a chance to see how much of the
scholar's heaven they can actually enter. Professor LoPucki's new claim
responds to this point. In his view, sophisticated parties today exploit
current law to write contracts regarding bankruptcy that redistribute wealth
to themselves from less sophisticated parties and involuntary creditors such
as tort victims. Parties would, he claims, use more freedom to contract to
engage in greater redistributional efforts. The relation between Professor
LoPucki's new claim and his challenge to my argument is this: If current
contracting practices support an inference that parties would abuse a greater
right to contract, giving them this right is unwise. A showing that my model
does not work thus both serves to defeat my particular claim about
bankruptcy contracting and helps to impeach the more general claim that
bans on free contracting should be repealed.
I am grateful to Professor LoPucki for giving me the opportunity to
clarify certain steps in my argument, but his reply itself is unsuccessful. A
disagreement between scholars can take three forms: First, there can be
disagreement about the state of the world. In law and economics, this
disagreement commonly takes the form of contesting the assumptions that
underlie a model. Second, there can be disagreement about the norms that
do or should apply to the case under study. Third, there can be
disagreement about the analysis. In this third category, the issue is whether
a scholar's conclusions follow from his premises. Professor LoPucki's
critique takes the third analytic form. He argues that my premises entail less
favorable conclusions for bankruptcy contracting than I claim. This critique
fails, however, because Professor LoPucki's arguments are either ruled out
by my model's plausible assumptions or reflect a misunderstanding of the
model. It does not follow that my policy prescriptions must be accepted,
because there still can be disagreement over facts or norms. But since
Professor LoPucki does not argue about facts or norms, and since my model
withstands his analytical critique, we are left where my essay ended. In the
absence of a plausible disagreement with my analysis that takes the first or
second form, the state should give free contracting a chance.
Part I below refutes Professor LoPucki's criticisms of my model. Part II
shows that current contracting practices are irrelevant to the question
whether ex ante bankruptcy contracts should be lawful, and thus that these
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contracts cannot support an inference that greater freedom to contract about
bankruptcy would be harmful. Part III is a conclusion that briefly discusses
what may be the basic source of the disagreement between Professor
LoPucki and me: that bankruptcy in my view is, and apparently in his view
is not, a part of the law of business transactions generally.
I. BANKRUPTCY CONTRACTING
A. When Creditors Lend at Different Times
1. A Summary of the Model
My model assumed that two bankruptcy systems existed. One system,
denoted L, resembled the current Chapter 7, and the other, denoted R,
resembled the current Chapter 11. For the purposes of this Response, the
parties in my model could write two types of bankruptcy contracts. The first
would not deal explicitly with bankruptcy at all, leaving the insolvent firm
free to choose the bankruptcy system it preferred ex post. Since creditors
are legally entitled to the full monetary return from a bankruptcy procedure,
the firm would not consider this return in making its choice. Rather, the
firm's owners/managers6 would choose the bankruptcy system that
maximized their private benefits. The parties, however, could renegotiate
after insolvency to induce the firm to choose the bankruptcy system that
generated the highest monetary return when that system did not also
maximize the firm's private benefits. The model assumed that a firm always
gets greater private benefits in the reorganization system R because the
managers get to run the firm for a longer time in that system and also have
some chance of saving the business. Hence, the parties would renegotiate
only when the liquidation system L turned out to generate a higher
monetary return than the reorganization system R. The creditors then would
pay the firm a sum to forgo the R system's greater private benefits and
instead enter liquidation.
The second contract I discussed-and the one Professor LoPucki
considers-authorized the firm to keep a portion of the monetary return that
would be generated by whatever bankruptcy system it chose. If this
portion-the "bribe"-were set appropriately, the sum of the private
benefits and cash payments the firm would get if it chose the optimal
6. My analysis focused on the firm's relationship with its debt investors, not the relationship
between the firm's managers and its equity investors. This focus was captured formally by
assuming that the firm's shareholders and managers had the same preferences regarding
bankruptcy procedures. The assumption often is realistic in the bankruptcy context because the




system always would exceed the firm's total payoff from choosing
suboptimally. This contract was called renegotiation-proof because the
parties would have no need to renegotiate later: The firm would choose the
efficient bankruptcy system if the contract bribe was correctly specified.
One or the other of these contracts would maximize the creditors'
insolvency-state payoff and thereby minimize the firm's cost of capital,
depending on the relevant economic parameters. For example, the
renegotiation contract would often be best when the reorganization system
had a higher expected return than the liquidation system. The creditors do
not pay a bribe under this contract and thus could keep the entire high
return that system R would generate; the firm would choose R without a
bribe because it would get greater private benefits in that system. If the
liquidation system generated the higher expected return, on the other hand,
the renegotiation-proof contract often would be best. The firm then would
have to be bribed to choose liquidation. The ex post bribe would exceed the
contractual bribe because ex post it is known with certainty that the firm
will choose the inefficient system; hence, the firm could exploit its
bargaining power to capture most of the monetary gain from choosing
optimally. Though one or the other of these contracts can be efficient,
depending on the economic parameters, only renegotiation contracts can be
written under current law. This restriction thus reduces welfare.
My model assumed that creditors could observe and verify to a court
the actual monetary return that a bankruptcy procedure would generate.
Thus, if the lending agreements promised the firm, say, 30% of the
monetary return from bankruptcy, the creditors could recover the remaining
70% in a bankruptcy proceeding. The creditors, however, could not verify
to a court, and might be unable to observe, all of the firm's private benefits.
This would not preclude bankruptcy-contracting, because the firm offers
creditors the bankruptcy contract, and it knows what its private benefits
would be; hence, it could select the contract-renegotiation or
renegotiation-proof-that would maximize the creditors' insolvency-state
return (and thereby lower the firm's capital costs). Creditors would sign
whatever contract the firm offered because, in a competitive credit market,
creditors earn zero profits in all equilibria and so would be indifferent to the
contract the firm chose; the interest rate would reflect the effect of that
contract.
A renegotiation-proof contract would have to be modified in those
cases in which the creditors lent at different times because the optimal bribe
could change with changes in the relevant economic parameters. The
contract thus would need a conversion term, such that if the optimal bribe
later changed, the bribes in all prior contracts would be updated to equal the
newly optimal bribe: the portion of the bankruptcy return from whatever
system the insolvent firm chose that would be sufficient to induce the firm
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to choose optimally. The initial creditor would sign a contract in which the
bribe could change because the contractual bribe would not change in
expectation.
2. Professor LoPucki's Reply
Professor LoPucki argues that the borrowing firm would exploit this
scheme in such a way as to cause the first lender not to sign. This would
unravel the scheme. To understand his claim, assume that when the firm
first borrows, it expects to borrow again, and the optimal bribe would give
the firm one-third of the monetary return from the bankruptcy system it
chose. This bribe is a function of the economic parameters the firm expects
would exist if it became insolvent. In an efficient market, the current
parameters are the best estimate of the future parameters. The firm thus
would believe, when it initially borrows, that a one-third bribe also will be
optimal when it borrows again. The firm, however, would not offer the
initial creditor a contract in which it agreed to choose the optimal
bankruptcy system in return for a bribe of one-third the bankruptcy return.
Rather, in Professor LoPucki's scheme, the firm would ask only for a bribe
of one-fourth that return. Since the initial creditor could keep 75% of the
bankruptcy return under this contract, the interest rate would be lower than
it would have been under the correct contract, which would pay the creditor
only two-thirds of the return. The firm would offer the incorrect contract to
the initial creditor because it knows that when it borrows again, it will
require the optimal one-third bribe in the later contract, and the first
contract will automatically convert to a one-third bribe as well. As a
consequence, the firm's full set of bankruptcy contracts would be consistent
and correct, but the first creditor would have been deceived into charging
an interest rate that is too low.8
The first creditor, however, would anticipate this deceitful behavior and
not lend. Nor could the borrowing firm overcome this reluctance because it
cannot make a credible commitment not to exploit the creditor in this way.
The optimal bribe is a function of the monetary returns and private benefits
that bankruptcy makes possible. Thus, if the firm later raised the bribe
percentage, the initial creditor could not sue to recover the interest
payments it erroneously gave up because the creditor could not establish the
7. In an efficient market, the best estimate of the economic parameters that will obtain
tomorrow is the parameters that obtain today. This is because, in the absence of a reason to
believe otherwise, a party will know that the parameters are as likely to increase as decrease;
hence, the expected value of these changes is zero. If there were a reason to believe otherwise,
then today's parameters would reflect this reason.
8. Professor LoPucki states: "[T]he firm could at least sometimes deceive the initial creditor
as to the optimal [bribe] percentage. If the firm succeeded in its deception, the firm would be able
to borrow on more favorable terms." LoPucki, supra note 4, at 325.
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value of the private benefits in court and so could not prove that the firm set
the initial bribe at an artificially low level.
Professor LoPucki claims that this result is consistent with my model's
assumptions and refutes my conclusions. There are at least two difficulties
with this position. First, Professor LoPucki's scheme is ruled out by the
assumption that parties in my model cannot commit fraud. Second, if fraud
were permitted, the desire of most firms to preserve good will would
prevent them from engaging in Professor LoPucki's scheme. Regarding the
first, the borrowing firm would be engaged in a fraud because it represented
to the initial creditor that a bribe of one-fourth the monetary return would
induce the firm to choose the optimal bankruptcy system when the firm
knew at the time it offered the contract that a bribe of one-third that return
would be necessary. Put another way, the firm intended not to perform its
contractual promise to choose the optimal bankruptcy system in return for a
payment of only one-fourth the bankruptcy return. A contractual promise
that is made with the present intention not to perform is a fraudulent
representation.9
Contract-theory models assume that parties will not engage in fraud.
This is because fraud will undo any contracting scheme, however simple. A
possible buyer thus would not purchase if he believed that the seller had a
present intention to substitute inferior goods for the contract goods after the
buyer paid, or a present intention not to honor the contract's repair and
replacement warranty. Consistent with this view, the Uniform Commercial
9. Section 530(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states that - [a] representation of the
maker's own intention to do or not to do a particular thing is fraudulent if he does not have that
intention." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 530(1) (1977). Comment c to this provision
states:
The rule stated in this Section finds common application when the maker misrepresents
his intention to perform an agreement made with the recipient. The intention to perform
the agreement may be expressed but it is normally merely to be implied from the
making of the agreement. Since a promise necessarily carries with it the implied
assertion of an intention to perform it follows that a promise made without such an
intention is fraudulent and actionable in deceit under the rule stated in § 525.
Id cmt c.
10. This assumption is made so often as generally to go without saying, but I can offer a few
examples. The first is from a famous early article. Sanford J. Grossman. The Informational Role of
Warranties and Private Disclosure About Product Quality, 24 J.L. & EcoN. 461 (1981). Professor
Grossman began his analysis of the warranty contracts that sellers would offer with the statement
"We restrict attention to [seller] disclosures which are truthful." Id. at 464. He went on to give an
example that was meant to show that buyers would make inferences about product quality or
quantity that are unfavorable to the seller when the seller is permitted to be silent or vague but
cannot lie. The example starts with these sentences: "Suppose the monopolist is selling boxes of
apples. He can label the boxes with an exact number of apples. but if he does this then this must
be the true amount under the above 'no lying' assumptions. However, he could also put no label
as to the quantity .... " Id. at 465. A second example is from a recent paper that prefaced its
analysis of what a good disclosure law would look like with the clarification: "Fraudulent
disclosures are not considered." Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty. Mandatory vs.
Voluntary Disclosure in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Consumers 7 (Aug. 1999)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale Law Journal).
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Code does not cover fraud, but rather regulates warranties and repair-and-
replacement promises under the assumption that sellers intend to honor
their contractual obligations when they sign agreements." Scholars and
decisionmakers thus assume that the law of torts will deter those frauds that
reputational considerations alone will not prevent, and they suppose that
transactional law will regulate deals among honest people. Consequently,
the task for contract theory is to ask what agreements parties will make
when they cannot lie to each other at the contracting stage. My model was
in that genre, and it is not embarrassed by showing that parties would reject
the contracts I identify if they could engage in fraudulent schemes. Many
more contracts than mine would be undone under that dispensation."
In addition, business borrowers would be unlikely to commit the fraud
Professor LoPucki imagines because, like many only imaginable frauds, the
good-will costs would be too high. The optimal bribe is a function of the
relative monetary returns that the two bankruptcy systems are expected to
generate and the private benefits that the firm can realize under either
system. If the liquidation system would generate high returns relative to the
reorganization system, for example, the bribe could be lower. The firm
gives up private benefits in return for a cash payment, and when the total
return is high, a cash payment that is a smaller portion of that return will
suffice. The bribe also could be lower if the private benefits that the two
systems permit do not differ by very much.
The firm, in Professor LoPucki's scheme, would have to tell the initial
creditor that the bankruptcy bribe it might later have to pay had been
raised. 3 At the time of the initial loan--denoted t°-a firm bent on fraud
thus knows that it later will need a justificatory story: It raised the requisite
bribe because the relation between the expected monetary returns the two
bankruptcy systems will generate has changed, or the relative private
benefits have changed (or both). The firm would not expect the relative
11. Section 1-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code states that "[ulnless displaced by
particular provisions of this Act, ... the law relative to ... estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation ...
bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions." U.C.C. § I -
103 (1993).
12. The bankruptcy contracts I consider are similar to most-favored-nation clauses in long-
term sales contracts. In these contracts, the seller agrees with the initial buyer that if the seller
offers better pricing terms to later buyers, the original contract will convert to the new terms. A
seller with market power could plan to defraud the original buyer by setting the original price at
an artificially high level, retaining this price in the later contracts it knows it will make, but
offering later buyers favorable non-price terms-such as prompt post-sale service-that are
difficult for the initial buyer to observe. In this way, the later buyers would get the deals that
current conditions warrant, while the initial buyer would always pay the excessive price. An early
buyer who anticipated this behavior might not agree to the contract. Despite this possibility, most-
favored-nation clauses are widely used, and scholars have examined their properties on the
(implicit) assumption that parties to them do not routinely commit fraud.
13. A lending agreement would require this updating notice to permit the initial creditor to




monetary returns to change because expected returns at time to are the best
predictor of the expected bankruptcy returns. My model also assumed that
creditors could observe the expected monetary returns from the two
systems.14 The firm thus would know at to that it would later have to justify
raising the bribe percentage-that is, lowering the initial creditor's
bankruptcy return-on the ground that the private benefits the firm expects
to realize in bankruptcy had changed between the time of the first and
second loans.'5
The good-will cost of conveying this justification would be substantial.
An initial creditor who could not observe the private benefits that the firm
would realize in bankruptcy would draw one of two inferences when the
firm raised the required bribe because of alleged changes in these benefits:
(a) The firm lied when it said it needed only one-fourth of the bankruptcy
financial return in order not to dissipate the creditor's bankruptcy claim in
an inefficient reorganization; that is, thefirm knew all along that it needed a
one-third bribe to behave fairly toward the creditor; or (b) the firm has
come to realize that it needs a higher bribe not to waste the creditor's assets
in a suboptimal procedure than the firm initially thought it needed. 6
Turning to good-will costs, assume for simplicity that when the firm
borrows again (and thus raises the initial bribe) its prospects are either bad
or good. If bad, the firm knows that it may need the initial creditor's
cooperation in a workout or a bankruptcy proceeding. A creditor who thinks
it has been defrauded is less likely to cooperate. If the firm's prospects are
good, it expects to have a continuing need for credit. The initial creditor
14. See equations (4) and (5) in Alan Schwartz, Contracting About Banknipicy, 13 J.L
ECON. & ORG. 127, 135-36 (1997), which set out the formal model from which my essay draws.
These returns are also terms in my essay's E(R) equations. See Schwartz. supra note 2, at 1829-
30.




I assumed that creditors could observe the denominator---the difference between the expected
monetary return in an optimal procedure L and in a suboptimal procedure R. The initial creditor
thus would know that the denominator had not changed. Hence, the firm would have to claim that
the optimal bribe fraction s" had risen because the numerator had changed: That is. the difference
between the private benefits the firm would receive in a suboptimal procedure R and in an optimal
procedure L had widened.
16. My model assumed for convenience that the initial creditor could not verify and might
not be able to observe private benefits at all, but this creditor likely can observe some elements of
these benefits, such as the salaries that the debtor's managers get. Partial observability strengthens
the argument made above. For example, if the firm raised the required bribe after unexpectedly
increasing the managers' salaries, the initial creditor would believe it was being exploited. And if
the firm raised the bribe though no observable elements of the private benefit variable had
changed, this would make more plausible a creditor inference that the firm had lied when it
specified the original bribe.
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then could be a source of funds or a credit reference. It would not perform
either task as the firm might wish, however, if it thought that it had been
defrauded. The firm thus would be reluctant to raise the bribe in the initial
lending agreement, and thereby convey a bad message to the initial lender,
unless the observable monetary parameters actually had changed. Hence,
the firms in my model would be reluctant to use Professor LoPucki's
scheme even if fraud were permitted. An initial creditor would know this
and thus would sign a bankruptcy contract.
B. Creditor Conflict
A creditor who refuses to sign a contract that would offer the firm a
bribe to choose the optimal bankruptcy system-the renegotiation-proof
contract-would have the right, in a bankruptcy, to claim the full value of
its unpaid debt, undiminished by the bribe the other creditors had agreed to
pay. If too many creditors refused to sign, the firm would anticipate that too
small a fraction of the bankrupt estate would remain after satisfying the
nonsigners to pay the firm the requisite bribe. As a consequence, the
contractual scheme would fail. Professor LoPucki believes that failure
would be common because creditor conflict is pervasive. This Response
will show (as my essay originally showed) that while junior and trade
creditors could in theory have incentives not to sign bankruptcy contracts,
they would not have these incentives in fact if bankruptcy law were
appropriately enforced and amended.
1. Junior and Senior Conflict
Under bankruptcy schemes that respect absolute priority, a junior
creditor is paid only after creditors senior to it have been paid in full.
Therefore, junior creditors would like the bankruptcy pie to be as large as
possible because this increases the chance that there will be something left
over. The seniors also would like the pie to be maximized; thus, both
juniors and seniors want the firm to choose the bankruptcy procedure that
maximizes the insolvency-state monetary return. Professor LoPucki
responds that junior creditors would prefer reorganization to liquidation
even when liquidation would generate a higher monetary return, if the
variance of returns in a reorganization would sufficiently exceed the
variance in a liquidation. Under this condition, the juniors' bankruptcy
claim would have a higher expected value in a low-return reorganization
than the claim would have in a higher-return liquidation.
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Professor LoPucki believes that variance-induced junior/senior conflict
"is the norm" 17 in bankruptcy contexts. This view encounters three
difficulties: First, as just noted, I assumed that courts would follow the
absolute priority rule while Professor LoPucki, we will see, assumes that
courts will violate the rule. Junior/senior conflict will vanish if courts
follow absolute priority. Second, even if courts misapply the rule, the
juniors and seniors commonly would agree on a bankruptcy contract. And
third, when they disagreed, conflict among them would be eliminated by
contract.
a. The Relevance of Absolute Priority
The first difficulty is best illustrated by example. At to, the firm
borrows $100 from senior creditors and $200 from junior creditors.S At t',
the firm realizes returns and either pays its debts if solvent, or enters
bankruptcy if insolvent. At t2 , the firm exits bankruptcy, either in
reorganized form or via a liquidation. If the firm is reorganized, it will be
worth $220 with probability .5 and $0 with probability .5, and so would
have a value of $110 (.5 x $220 + .5 x $0 = $110). Assume for tractability
that the firm would be worth $100 in a liquidation with certainty. The
example is set out in Figure 1, in which the parties' payoffs are in





The firm should be reorganized because its going concern value of
$110 exceeds its liquidation value of $100. Section 1129(b)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code provides that a court cannot confirm a reorganization plan
unless the plan complies with § 1129(a) and also "does not discriminate
unfairly, and is fair and equitable" to dissenting creditor classes. Section
17. LoPucki, supra note 4, at 329.
18. The seniors could hold security or the juniors could have purchased subordinated debt.
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1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) uses the absolute priority rule to put a floor under
reorganization bargaining. A creditor class that rejects a plan must "receive
or retain under the plan on account of [its] claim.., property of a value, as
of the effective date of the plan, that is not less than the amount that such
holder would so receive or retain if the debtor were liquidated under chapter
7 of this title on such date." '9 These rules require the senior claimants in
this example to receive an equity or debt interest in the reorganized firm at
time t2 that would return $200 to them if the firm were successful. The
seniors would then hold "property of a value" as of the date of receipt that
would be worth $100 (.5 x $200 + .5 x $0 = $100). This sum equals the
face value of their debt and also is "not less than" what the seniors would
have received "if the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 ... on such
date." Figure 1 thus gives the seniors a payoff of $200 if the reorganization
is successful.
Absolute priority would be violated if the seniors were to receive an
interest in the reorganized firm that was worth only $100 in the event or
success. In such a case, the seniors would have received property in
liquidation that was worth $100, but would receive property in
reorganization that was worth only $50 (.5 x $100 + .5 x $0 = $50). The
value of the juniors' claim, conversely, would be $0 in liquidation, but
would be $60 in reorganization (.5 x $120 + .5 x $0 = $60). The seniors
thus would have been paid in full had a court ordered liquidation, but would
be giving up $50 in expected value to the juniors in a reorganization. This
would violate absolute priority.20
19. 11 U.S.C. § 129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (1994).
20. The analysis in the text reflects the only plausible reading of the quoted Bankruptcy Code
sections, and there is closely analogous Supreme Court authority as well. In Dewsnup v. Timn.
502 U.S. 410 (1992), the Court recognized the need to give a secured creditor the upside return to
avoid reducing the value of its claim. To understand the issue in Dewsnup, assume that, at the
beginning of a bankruptcy, a secured creditor had a lien on property with a then-market value of
$200. This value would be a weighted average of the values that could later obtain when the
creditor had a right to foreclose (or was awarded the financial equivalent of that right). To
facilitate discussion, assume that there is a one-third chance of the property being worth as much
as $300 at the end of the bankruptcy procedure; a one-third chance that it will be worth $200: and
a one-third chance that it will be worth $100. A junior creditor seeks to "strip the lien," under
Bankruptcy Code § 506(d). Were a bankruptcy court to agree, the senior's claim in bankruptcy
would be frozen at its current market value of $200, and the junior would receive $100 if the
property later increased in value to $300. Stripping the lien, however, would reduce the value of
the secured creditor's bankruptcy claim. It would then hold a lien worth $166.33 ('/, X $200 + '/,
X $100 = $166.33); for the creditor would get $200 whether the property turned out to be worth
$300 or $200, and would get $100 in the remaining possible case. Put another way, the secured
creditor could have recovered $200 if it were allowed to foreclose, but instead it is holding a lien
that has a present value of $166.33. The Supreme Court refused to allow the lien to be stripped in
this fashion, thereby ensuring that the secured creditor's bankruptcy claim equaled, on an
expected basis, the current market value of the property. See id. Commentators criticized this
result as a matter of statutory construction but approved of it as a matter of policy. See. e.g..
ROBERT L. JORDAN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY 133 (5th ed. 1999); JAMES J. WHITE & RAYMOND T.
NIMMER, BANKRUPTCY CASES AND MATERIALS 443 n.2 (3d ed. 1996). For theoretical treatments
of the issue, see Barry E. Adler, Creditor Rights After Johnson and Dewsnup, 10 BANKR. DEV. J.
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Professor LoPucki's claim that junior/senior conflict over bankruptcy
contracts would be pervasive rests on the mistaken belief that a bankruptcy
court following absolute priority would award the seniors in the example
here an interest in the reorganized firm that would trade for only $50. This
can be seen by referring to the example in his essay2" in which the firm
owed $100 to the seniors, $200 to the juniors, would return $100 in
liquidation with certainty, and would be worth $200 with probability .4 and
zero with probability .6 if the firm were reorganized. The juniors would
receive nothing if the firm were liquidated. Professor LoPucki assumed that
both juniors and seniors would receive $100 if the firm turned out to be
successful. The value of the juniors' interest in the reorganized firm would
then be $40 (.4 x $100 + .6 x $0 = $40), and the juniors would prefer
reorganization to liquidation. The value of the reorganization interest the
seniors would receive, however, would also be worth $40. This would be
less than the face value of their debt and less than what the seniors would
have received "if the debtor were liquidated under Chapter 7." Hence,
Professor LoPucki's example rests on the implicit assumption that
bankruptcy courts do not follow absolute priority.
My essay assumed that courts would correctly apply the absolute
priority rule (and that parties would know the law). On these assumptions,
junior creditors would expect to receive value in a reorganization only after
the seniors were awarded an interest in the reorganized firm that would
trade in the market on the plan's confirmation date for an amount no greater
than the face value of the seniors' debt and no less than the value the
seniors would have received had the firm been liquidated. To satisfy these
requirements would require the seniors in Professor LoPucki's example and
in mine to receive property that would return $200 if the reorganized firm
succeeded. The juniors in both of these examples thus would expect to
receive nothing in a reorganization and so would have no reason to prefer
one bankruptcy procedure to the other. Consequently, the juniors would
have no reason to obstruct a bankruptcy contracting scheme. Put more
generally, ex ante junior/senior conflict between liquidation and
reorganization would largely vanish if bankruptcy courts followed absolute
priority.
1 (1993-1994); Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson. Corporate Reorganizations and the
Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured
Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 97 (1984). Regarding the example in the text. if the
insolvent firm has an expected value of SI10, a court would preserve the value of the seniors'
claim (which often will result from holding security) by giving the seniors an interest in the
reorganized firm that would return $200 if the firm were successful. This interest would have a
value of $100 on an expected basis.
21. See LoPucki, supra note 4, at 327-28.
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b. The Unlikelihood of Conflict
Professor LoPucki's claim of conflict would be unpersuasive (though
not ruled out by assumption) if courts were assumed not to follow absolute
priority. Such courts would award the juniors a $50 interest in the
reorganized firm in Professor LoPucki's example.2 This example requires
clarification before it can be analyzed. Professor LoPucki introduces the
example with the sentence, "At the time it must choose between liquidation
and reorganization [t'], the firm owes $100 to senior creditors and $200 to
junior creditors. ' 23 This is the wrong time. The issue is whether conflicts
will exist among creditors at the contracting stage, not after Humpty
Dumpty has fallen from the wall.
Regarding the ex ante case, a junior creditor will know, at the
contracting stage, that if too few other creditors sign the firm's
renegotiation-proof contract, the contractual scheme will fail whether the
illustrative creditor signs or not. The junior also will know that if enough
other creditors sign the renegotiation-proof contract, the scheme will come
into existence regardless of what it does. The junior's agreement will count
only when it is "pivotal" -only when its assent would save the contracting
scheme and its dissent would kill it.
To see what the junior will do (in a world in which absolute priority is
not followed), realize that junior creditors have a call option on the
insolvent firm: They can buy the firm from the seniors by paying the
seniors' claims. A pivotal junior thus will refuse to sign the renegotiation-
proof bankruptcy contract when its call option would be more valuable if
the firm has freedom to choose a suboptimal bankruptcy system ex post
than if the firm has been bribed contractually to choose optimally. To put
this choice a little more precisely, denote the value of the junior's call
option if a renegotiation-proof bankruptcy contract exists as X. Then
Xo = PL (value of call for optimal L)
+ (1 - PL) (value of call for optimal R). (1)
Here, PL is the probability that the liquidation procedure L will be optimal,
and (I - PL) is the probability that the reorganization procedure R will be
optimal.
If there is no renegotiation-proof contract, assume that the firm will
choose procedure R whether R is efficient or not (and the court will not
follow absolute priority). Denote the value of the junior's call option in this
circumstance as Xso. Then
22. The statements in my essay relating to the juniors' possible preference for low return but
high variance reorganizations referred to this case.
23. LoPucki, supra note 4, at 327.
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Xso = PL (value of call for suboptimal R)
+ (1 -PL) (value of call for optimal R). (2)
When procedure R would be optimal, with probability (I - PL)' the firm
will choose it without a renegotiation-proof bankruptcy contract, but when
procedure L would be optimal, with probability PL' the firm nevertheless
will choose procedure R. Both juniors and seniors would prefer there to be
no contract if the firm chose R whenever R turned out to be optimal,
because then the creditors' payoffs would not be diminished by a bribe.
Thus, the juniors and seniors would be in conflict when the first term of
equation (2) exceeded the first term of equation (I): A call option on the
firm in the bankruptcy system with the lower return would be more
valuable than a call option on the firm in the system with the higher return.
The value of a call option increases with (i) the ratio of the asset price
(here, the expected value of the firm if insolvent) to the exercise price (here,
the face value of the unpaid senior debt); (ii) the option's time to maturity
multiplied by the market interest rate; and (iii) the variance of the per
period return multiplied by the number of periods until maturity. The
parties cannot affect the market interest rate or the number of periods until
the firm becomes insolvent-factor (ii). Junior/senior conflict at the
contracting stage thus would be "the norm" if the value-increasing effect of
greater variance-factor (iii)-commonly outweighed in bankruptcy
contexts the value decreasing effect of a lower ratio of asset to exercise
price-factor (i).
The variance effect would have to be very strong for this conflict to
occur routinely. To see why, consider a simple example in which, when the
parties contract, the firm is expected to be worth $100 if it later is liquidated
in an optimal procedure. The $100 value could vary between the time of the
credit extension and the time of insolvency. For simplicity, let this time be
one year and suppose that the firm later could take only two values: The
firm when insolvent could be worth 20% more than its current expected
value-the firm would then be worth $120-or it could be worth 80% of its
current expected value, which would be $80. The senior debt is expected to
be $100; the junior debt also is $100 and the interest rate is 10% a year. The
juniors' call option to purchase the firm for $100 thus is "on the money,"
and its value is $13.64. Next let the firm be worth $70 in procedure R
24. To calculate the (approximate) value of a call option, realize that the value of the option is
equivalent to an investment in the underlying asset and borrowing. Regarding the investment
strategy, let an investor buy one-half the firm at its expected insolvency value of S100 and borrow
$36.36. The cost of purchasing this "portfolio" would be $50 - S36.36 = $13.64. If the firm rose
in value to $120, one-half the firm would be worth S60. but the investor must pay the loan off. and
at a 10% interest rate this would cost him $40 ($36.36 X 1.1 = $40). Hence, his payoff would be
$20. If the firm fell in value to $80, one-half the firm would be worth $40. but again the investor
would have to repay $40 and so would earn nothing. If the investor instead bought a call option on
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(when it would be worth $100 in the optimal procedure L). The
reorganization value too could vary with time. Assume that the firm later
could take on only two values: (i) it could increase in value to be worth
$130, or (ii) it could decrease in value to be worth $40. The juniors' call
option in this case would be worth $11.23. The juniors thus would prefer
the same renegotiation-proof contract that the seniors prefer because the
value of the juniors' call option would be greater if the firm always chose
the optimal bankruptcy procedure when insolvent.
In this example, the juniors would receive $30 if reorganization
succeeded ($130 less the seniors' $100 claim) and $20 if liquidation
succeeded ($120 - $100). The juniors nevertheless would prefer a
bankruptcy contract that would induce the firm to liquidate. A more
relevant way to put this result is to note that the liquidation value of the
firm could increase by 20% (from $100 to $120) while the reorganization
value could increase by 86% (from $70 to $130). Thus, junior creditors in
the example would have the same contractual preference as the seniors even
though reorganization value was more than four times more volatile than
liquidation value. Option theory also indicates that Professor LoPucki's ex
post example is extreme. In that example, the high-value procedure L had
zero variance; the firm would be worth $100 in this procedure with
certainty. The firm had an expected value of $80 in procedure R with
positive variance; it could increase in value to $200. Since the low-value R
procedure in his example had positive variance while the high-value L
procedure had zero variance, mathematically the low-value R procedure
was infinitely more varied than the high-value L procedure. If absolute
priority is not followed, junior creditors would prefer the procedure that had
the firm, he would earn $20 if the firm rose in value to $120 (recall that the exercise price is $100)
but would earn nothing if the firm fell in value to $80 (because he would not exercise the option).
Since the payoffs from buying the call option and from buying one-half the firm and borrowing
are the same, the cost of these alternatives (in an efficient market) must be the same. Therefore.
the call option would have a value of $13.64. The investor would know he should buy one-half the
firm by calculating the "option delta," which reflects the sensitivity of the call price to changes in
the underlying asset price. The delta here is
spread of possible option prices 20 - 0 I
spread of possible asset prices 120- 80 2
The amount of the required loan L is given by solving
ASu - Cu
r
where A is the option delta, Su is the high value of the asset, Cu is the payoff from the option
when the asset increases in value, and r is the interest rate. The other option value that follows in
the paragraph in text is calculated similarly. For a review of this simplified method for computing
approximate option value, see RICHARD A. BREALEY & STUART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 568-77 (5th ed. 1996).
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infinitely more variance, but the condition that one bankruptcy procedure is
infinitely more varied than the other seldom would be satisfied in practice.
In sum, unless there is good reason to believe that reorganization returns are
orders of magnitude more volatile than liquidation returns, junior/senior
conflict is unlikely to be "the norm" even if courts fail to follow absolute
priority.
c. The Contractual Solution
If dissenting junior creditors were to kill an optimal bankruptcy
contract, the financial losses they would impose on the seniors would
exceed the juniors' financial gain. This is why the contract the juniors
prefer is suboptimal. The firm, however, could realize some of the net gain
from an efficient bankruptcy contract by offering it and using the gains
from the desirable terms the seniors would grant to purchase the juniors'
consent.' Professor LoPucki acknowledges that this Pareto-improving deal
is possible in theory, but he claims that the deal would not occur because
the juniors and seniors do not deal with each other.26 This claim overlooks
the ability of the firm to bargain with all of its creditors, and thus to offer a
set of contracts to them that would exploit the efficiency gains from an
optimal choice of a bankruptcy system.-' Professor LoPucki actually
concedes that the firm can coordinate bankruptcy bargains among creditors
who "never negotiate with one another" because he accepts the result of
my model that a firm's bankruptcy contracts would be efficient regarding
my assumptions that creditors lend at the same time and have the same
preferences over bankruptcy procedures. The creditors that I posited dealt
with the firm, not with each other.
25. Some readers may find the argument in text to be clarified by a formal statement. Assume
that procedure L would generate a higher value for the insolvent firm than procedure R. The
difference in value between the two procedures is denoted %'L - r, = z. Thc junior creditors,
suppose, would do better with the firm in reorganization (if the court did not follow absolute
priority). Let the juniors' incremental gain from reorganization be x. Assume that the senior
creditors hold 2, of the firm's debt and the junior creditors hold 1 - X. Social welfare in procedure
L is the sum of the parties' gains from using the value-increasing procedure less the junior
creditors' loss: WL = Lz + (I - X) z - x = z - x. If L is efficient, as is assumed, then I, > 0 because
z > x. In a competitive credit market, the firm realizes the surplus that its lending agreements
create. As just shown, the surplus from an efficient set of bankruptcy contracts is IV,. The firm
could capture a portion of this surplus by sweetening the terms of its junior debt in return for that
debt's agreement to sign an optimal bankruptcy contract.
26. His essay states: "[Tihe conflict between junior and senior creditors would be resolved by
a contract between them that maximized the value of the estate and divided the increase in value
thus attained between them in such a manner that each would be better off.... [This contract will
not be made because] creditors ... have no means of bribing one another because they never
negotiate with one another." LoPucki, supra note 4, at 329-30.
27. The ability of a firm to coordinate its lending agreements to achieve efficiency has been
recognized previously. See Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American
Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311, 313-15 (1993); Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan
Priorities, 18J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 210-11 (1989).
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To summarize, junior/senior conflict would not occur if courts followed
absolute priority, is unlikely to occur if they do not, and will not prevent
bankruptcy contracting when it does occur.
2. Trade and Financial Creditor Conflict
Financial creditors and trade creditors both would like to be repaid, but
trade creditors sometimes also would prefer to continue dealing with the
insolvent firm. This preference would be strong when the creditor had made
a firm-specific investment in the relationship; then the creditor would be
earning rents. Such a creditor might be purchasing a specialized input from
the insolvent firm or have partially specialized its sales force to deal with
the firm. When the trade creditor would expect to do better continuing the
firm in existence for a time in a value-decreasing reorganization than it
would do collecting its share of the higher liquidation return on its pre-
bankruptcy debt, the creditor would refuse to sign the renegotiation-proof
contract. That contract would induce the firm to choose the more rapid
procedure L whenever L would generate a sufficiently high monetary
return.
My essay made two points about this conflict. First, it is difficult to say
how often trade creditors would have the incentive and the power to block a
bankruptcy-contracting scheme. Second, whatever power the trade creditors
have would be eliminated if the law also were amended to provide that the
scheme would become effective if a majority in amount of the debt signed
the contract. Under this reform, the contractual scheme would govern
unless a majority in amount of the debt was held by trade creditors who
expected later to do better sacrificing a portion of their bankruptcy claims in
return for continuing the insolvent firm in procedure R. The prevailing
assumption is that while insolvent firms often have more trade than
financial creditors, the financial creditors commonly hold the largest
portion of the firm's debt.28
Moreover, a majoritarian trade-creditor preference for the renegotiation
contract (in which the firm is not contractually bribed to choose the optimal
system) would prevail only when a renegotiation-proof contract would be
28. Professor LoPucki raised several objections to this majority-rule proposal. See LoPucki.
supra note 4, at 330. First, it was unclear how the majority should be counted. As just noted. the
proposal was to permit the preferences of a majority in amount of the firm's debt to control.
Second, the proposal was inconsistent with the conversion term discussed above, which would
alter the bribe percentages in earlier contracts to the percentage in the firm's latest contract. It is
unclear why he thinks that an inconsistency would exist. Suppose, for example, that a majority (mn
amount) of creditors sign the firm's renegotiation-proof contract. If the law were to provide that
the preferences of a majority would control as regards bankruptcy, the contractual terms in the
firm's contracts with these creditors would become required terms in the firm's contracts with the
remaining creditors. Hence, the firm's credit contracts would be consistent.
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inefficient. To see why, realize first that the trade creditors could have a
minority in amount of the debt that existed at bankruptcy but incur losses
from the firm's relatively rapid disappearance in procedure L that would
outweigh the financial creditors' gains. The financial creditors would ignore
these losses to vote for the renegotiation-proof contract. The firm would
contract out of this inefficiency, however, by refusing to offer any creditor a
renegotiation-proof contract. The worse ex ante deals the firm would get
from its financial creditors without the contract would be more than
outweighed by the better deals the firm would get from its trade creditors.
When the trade creditors held a majority in amount of the debt, its dissent
sometimes would kill a bankruptcy contract in favor of a contract that
imposed losses on the financial creditors in excess of gains to the trade
creditors. The trade, like the financial, creditors would not consider these
losses when making its decision. Again, however, the firm could obtain
sufficiently good terms from the financial creditors by offering the optimal
bankruptcy contract to permit the firm to induce the trade creditors to sign
also. As a consequence, majority rule contracts would be efficient either
automatically or because of the firm's actions.
i[. THE IRRELEVANCE OF CURRENT BANKRUPTCY CONTRACTING
Professor LoPucki devotes more than a third of his reply to an
argument that sophisticated parties today contract about bankruptcy with
the primary object of redistributing wealth to themselves from involuntary
and nonadjusting creditors. ' This argument seems meant to show that
society would not benefit even if ex ante bankruptcy contracting were
permitted and did occur. Professor LoPucki primarily discusses
securitization and ex post stay waivers, and he infers from these and other
current contracting practices that the "real-world appeal of bankruptcy
contracts lies less in their capacity to maximize social welfare than in their
capacity to redistribute wealth." ' This leads to Professor LoPucki's
conclusion that ex ante bankruptcy contracts that fail to have the actual
assent of every creditor, voluntary and involuntary, "may be both
redistributional and inefficient." 3
This conclusion cannot rest on the contractual practices that Professor
LoPucki criticizes here. In understanding why, begin with involuntary
creditors. Securitization, stay waivers, and the other contracts Professor
LoPucki discusses attempt to remove the firm from bankruptcy jurisdiction
29. This view is controversial. Compare Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE
L.J. 1 (1996), with James J. White, Corporate Judgment Proofing: A Response to L)ym LoPucki's
The Death of Liability, 107 YALE L.J. 1363 (1998).
30. LoPucki, supra note 4, at 339.
31. Id at342.
1999]
The Yale Law Journal
altogether. If the contracts succeed in this, then rules that protect
involuntary creditors in bankruptcy may be ineffectual. The contracts I
discuss, in contrast, would permit the parties to choose among state-
supplied bankruptcy systems. If the state, for example, were to give tort
claimants an administrative priority in all of its bankruptcy systems, the
general creditors in my world would take behind these claimants, for the
general creditors would be in a bankruptcy system. Thus, permitting
bankruptcy contracting would not remove involuntary creditors from the
protection of bankruptcy law.
Professor LoPucki's reference to the exploitation of nonadjusting
creditors also is not germane. In commercial law scholarship, a
nonadjusting creditor will not alter the interest rate (or other terms) to
reflect its actual priority position. For example, other things being equal, a
creditor should charge a higher interest rate when it would take behind a
secured creditor than when it would take pro rata with that creditor. A
nonadjusting creditor, however, will charge the lower pro rata interest rate
either because it is unsophisticated or because the costs of altering its
contracts deal by deal would be too high in relation to the gains.
Nonadjusting creditors thus are disadvantaged by their contracts with the
firm.32
Bankruptcy contracts could not disadvantage creditors just because they
were unsophisticated or did not find it cost-justified to focus on bankruptcy
contracts. The firm in my model offers a bankruptcy contract to every
creditor. Creditors who pay attention will sign the optimal contract with
respect to bankruptcy. This contract would induce the firm to choose the
bankruptcy procedure that would maximize the ex post value of the firm,
and this would benefit the nonsigners. Therefore, while there can be
nonsigning creditors in the world I model, there seldom will be
nonadjusting creditors-a subset of creditors who would have rejected the
firm's contract had they paid attention. To summarize, it is a non sequitur to
infer from current contracting practices about bankruptcy that the ex ante
bankruptcy contracts I describe would be redistributional rather than
efficient. Rather, this must be shown by an analysis of the contracts
themselves.
32. For analyses of nonadjusting creditors, see Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried. The
Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857 (1996); and
Ronald J. Mann, The First Shall Be Last: A Contextual Argument for Abandoning Temporal Rules
of Lien Priority, 75 TEX. L. REV. 11 (1996). An argument that the case for the exploitation of
relatively small creditors is poorly grounded is made in Alan Schwartz, Priority Contracts and




The differences between Professor LoPucki and me lie in the realm of
analysis, not in the realm of opinion. Professor LoPucki proposed a
contracting practice that would unravel the sequential bankruptcy contracts
I developed. Such a practice is fraudulent, and my model assumed the
absence of fraud. Therefore, Professor LoPucki's practice would not
unravel these contracts. Professor LoPucki developed an example to show
that junior/senior conflict over bankruptcy procedures would disrupt any
bankruptcy contracting scheme. This example follows only if courts do not
observe absolute priority, but my model assumed that courts would observe
absolute priority. Therefore, Professor LoPucki has not shown that
junior/senior conflict would disrupt bankruptcy contracting? 3 Professor
LoPucki argues that trade/financial creditor conflict also is pervasive and
would preclude much bankruptcy contracting. His argument presupposes a
legal world in which the preferences of a majority in amount of creditor
claims would not determine whether a bankruptcy contract became
effective. My model assumed that majority preferences would control, and
when they do, trade/financial creditor conflict would be overcome.
Therefore, this conflict would not preclude bankruptcy contracting.
Professor LoPucki acknowledges that if creditors could deal with each
other, they could write contracts that would overcome many of the conflicts
he thinks they face, but the creditors do not deal with each other. The
borrowing firm, however, deals with all of the creditors and so could
coordinate contracting among them. Therefore, contracting among the
parties would cure many of the difficulties Professor LoPucki believes
would otherwise exist. Drawing upon current contracting practices that
attempt to avoid bankruptcy altogether, Professor LoPucki infers that ex
ante bankruptcy contracts also would deprive some claimants of the law's
deserved protection. The bankruptcy contracts I discuss would permit the
parties to choose a bankruptcy procedure, not to avoid bankruptcy.
Therefore, Professor LoPucki's inference fails. We are thus left where my
essay ended-with a plausible case for expanding the scope of free
contracting in bankruptcy.
The lengthy treatment in Professor LoPucki's essay of commercial
practices that have nothing to do with ex ante bankruptcy contracts suggests
that he is suspicious of all contractual schemes that deal with bankruptcy.
This suspicion appears most clearly in his note 114, where he remarks that
it is hard to know how often parties today avoid the current bankruptcy
33. This Response also shows that junior/senior conflict would be rare even if courts did not
follow absolute priority.
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system because successful attempts necessarily are invisible to outside
observers. He says of this:
Secrecy may provide an important reason for society to reject
contract solutions. The problems with regulation occur publicly and
are therefore subject to examination and correction through the
political process. The problems with contract occur privately and
can be examined only to the extent that contracting parties
volunteer information or the state requires disclosure. The latter is
unlikely to occur unless some question is first raised regarding the
particular type of contracting.'
This view implies that every commercial contract that could affect a third
party should be approved by a regulator as a condition to its becoming
effective. Otherwise, "the problems with" these contracts would "occur
privately." 3-
Professor LoPucki probably would not advocate the creation of a
federal Agency of Contractual Justice to regulate the tens of millions of
contacts a year that could create externalities or that might be unfair.
Rather, he seems to think that bankruptcy is special; hence, contracting
about bankruptcy should be specially regulated. Professor LoPucki thus
appears to be what Douglas Baird recently called a traditionalist about
bankruptcy-a person who thinks that the state should regulate bankruptcy
with laws whose animating rationales are (and ought to be) rejected
everywhere else.36 Professor Baird challenged the traditionalists to say why
bankruptcy is special in this way. Professor LoPucki's essay here may be a
prologue to such an explanation but it is too brief to be the explanation
itself.
34. LoPucki, supra note 4, at 336 n.1 14.
35. Professor LoPucki also claims that the "principal problem in attempting to apply" a
contracting theory to bankruptcy "is that most creditors' interests are too small to warrant their
active, knowledgeable participation" in a bankruptcy procedure. Id. at 34 1. A bankruptcy contract
governs the state of the world in which the firm's transactions have failed. Hence, Professor
LoPucki's view applies to commercial contracting generally; for many terms in commercial
contracts concern what should be done if the deal goes bad. If "most" parties have too little at
stake "to warrant their active, knowledgeable participation" in the legal worlds these terms create,
then a large portion of commercial contracts should be regulated to ensure their fairness.
36. See Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573 (1999).
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